The capacity region of a channel consists of all achievable rate vectors. Picking a particular point in the capacity region is synonymous with rate allocation. The issue of fairness in rate allocation is addressed in this paper. We review several notions of fairness, including max-min fairness, proportional fairness and Nash bargaining solution. Their efficiencies for general multiuser channels are discussed. We apply these ideas to the Gaussian multiple access channel (MAC) and the Gaussian broadcast channel (BC). We show that in the Gaussian MAC, max-min fairness and proportional fairness coincide. For both Gaussian MAC and BC, we devise efficient algorithms that locate the fair point in the capacity region. Some elementary properties of fair rate allocations are proved.
Introduction
There are several fairness criteria in rate allocation. The simplest one is to mandate that all users have the same data rate and maximize this common data rate within the capacity region. This allocation is equitable and maximize the data rate of the worst user. However, it often does not effectively utilize system resources.
Another criterion is called max-min fairness. It relaxes equity and allows increasing the rates of some users without lowering the minimum data rate in the system. Under such an allocation policy, nobody can be benefited by worsening anybody who has lower data rate. It can be rephrased as follows. If we take some resources from a wealthy user to a relatively poor user (without reversing the order of wealthiness), the resulting allocation is considered fairer. Such operation is called a Robinhood operation. We say that an allocation is max-min fair if no Robinhood operation is possible without violating feasibility.
The max-min fairness is considered quite stringent. Any decrease of rate of a user with low data rate cannot be compensated by increasing the rate of any user with higher rate, no matter how small the decrease is. Kelly considers logarithmic utility function and proposes proportional fairness for network flow control [1] . Roughly speaking, we say that a rate allocation is proportionally fair if any adjustment will decrease the sum of percentage change over all users. A framework of optimization is thereby introduced using Lagrangian technique. Both max-min and proportional fairness are popular criteria for flow control in unicast and multicast networks [2, 3] .
Another classical notion of fairness is the Nash bargaining solution coined by Nash in the 50's [4] . In fact, proportional fairness is its special case. The Nash bargaining solution is a standard tool in cooperative game theory, and is applied widely in network resource allocation. For example, see [5] for application to orthogonal frequency division multiple-access networks.
Yet there is another fairness criterion based on the theory of majorization. We will give formal definitions of all the above criteria in the next section.
In this paper, the problem of picking a point in the capacity region of Gaussian MAC and BC according to some fairness criteria is considered. Some works have been done on Gaussian MAC. The sum rate at the max-min fair allocation is characterized in [6] . The polymatroid structure of the capacity region of Gaussian MAC is exploited in [7, 8] , and algorithms for locating the max-min fair point are found. Implementation issue is addressed in [9] .
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give precise definitions of fairness, and review the theory of majorization and Schur-convexity. The results are summarized in Section 3, and the details for the Gaussian MAC and BC are in Section 4 and 5 respectively. The appendix contains some proofs of the theorems in Section 4.
Fairness, Majorization and Schur-convexity
The set of all users is denoted by Ω = {1, . . . , K}.
In this section, we review several fairness criteria, and the theory of majorization. We will use the symbol R to represent capacity region, which is assumed to be a closed and convex set throughput this section.
An allocation is symmetric if every user has the same data rate. Symmetric capacity is the maximal sum rate of all symmetric allocations, C sym (R) := max{Kr : (r, r, . . . , r) ∈ R}.
An allocation is called max-min fair if we cannot increase the rate r i of user i without decreasing r j for some r j ≤ r i , while maintaining feasibility. At the max-min fair allocation, no user can increase the data rate without compromising users with lower data rate. Formally speaking, a rate allocation r MM is max-min fair in R if for any r ∈ R such that r MM i < r i for some i, then we can find j ∈ Ω such that r j < r . The sum of rate at the max-min fair allocation for capacity region R is called the max-min capacity and is denoted by C MM (R).
Proportional fair (PF) rate allocation (r P F i ) i=1...K is the data rate allocation that maximizes
log r i .
The proportional fair capacity is the corresponding sum rate,
Since the capacity region R is closed and convex, and the log function is concave, the maximization is well-defined. Another characterization of the proportional fair allocation r P F is
for all point r in the capacity region R.
In the Nash bargaining solution, there is a notion of disagreement point, which is the default operating point if the users fail to reach any agreement. User i will not accept any data rate lower than d i . The rate allocated to user i in the Nash bargaining solution should be larger than or equal to d i (Fig. 1 ). If we are given a disagreement point d in the capacity region, the Nash bargaining solution maximizes
over all points in the region {r ∈ R :
The Nash bargaining solution satisfies several desirable properties. See [10] for details. It is obviously identical to the proportional fair solution when the origin is chosen as the disagreement point. For a vector x = (x 1 , . . . x K ) ∈ R K + , we denote the components in nondecreasing order by
We say that vector x is majorized by vector y, written as x y, if for k = 1, . . . , K − 1,
y [i] , and
In other words, if we sort the components of x and y in nondecreasing order, the cumulative sum of the components of x is larger than the corresponding cumulative sum of y. Majorization induces a partial order that measures dispersion. It is known as the Lorenz order in economics, and is used for comparing income distributions. When x y, we say that the distribution according to x is less spread out, and is thus fairer than that of y. A canonical example is that the vector
is majorized by any vector in R K + whose components sum to 1.
, whenever x y.
If the inequality above is reversed, then we say that the function f is Schur concave. A class of Schur-convex functions is constructed using the following lemma.
is Schur-convex (Schur-concave).
A useful criterion for Schur-convexity is as follows.
Lemma 2 (Schur's criterion). Suppose that F : R K + → R is differentiable and symmetric, meaning that F (x 1 , . . . , x K ) = F (x π(1) , . . . , x π(K) ) for any x and permutation π of {1, . . . , K}. Then
See [11] for more on the theory of majorization and Schur-convexity.
Capacity-Fairness Tradeoff
Usually there is a tradeoff between sum rate and fairness. The next theorem illustrates such a tradeoff. It shows that the requirement of symmetric fairness is more stringent than proportional fairness in the sense that the symmetric capacity is always less than or equal to the proportional-fair capacity. We use the notation C sum for the sum capacity, defined as
Theorem 3. For any convex region R,
Equality holds in the first inequality in the first line only if the PF allocation is symmetric.
Proof. All inequalities are obvious except the the first inequality in the first line, i.e., C sym (R) ≤ C P F (R). Let (r 0 , . . . , r 0 ) be the maximal symmetric rate allocation, and (r P F 1 , . . . , r P F K ) be the proportional fair rate allocation in region R. We have
The first inequality comes from the defining property of proportional fairness, and the second is the AM-GM inequality. Thus,
When equality holds, then we must have r
K . This proves the first inequality.
In general, the max-min capacity may or may not be larger than the proportional fair capacity. However, in Gaussian MAC, both max-min and proportional fair capacity achieve the sum capacity. In fact, the max-min fair and proportional fair rate allocation in Gaussian MAC coincide. It is hence not necessary Symmetric Max-min and PF Max. sum rate 
Theorem 32 false to distinguish between max-min and proportional fairness in Gaussian MAC. Meanwhile, in Gaussian BC, max-min capacity is the same as symmetric capacity. Given a rate allocation r, we define its efficiency, η, as the ratio between the sum rate at r and the maximal sum capacity. Obviously, this is a number between zero and one. For proportional fairness, we have the following lower bound on η. Proof. By the definition of proportional fairness, the region R is contained in the polyhedron P defined by
and r i ≥ 0 for all i. Therefore, C sum (R) is not larger than C sum (P), which is equal to K max i r P F i . Hence,
We will show that in Gaussian MAC, η P F is exactly 1; it achieves the maximal value. In Gaussian BC, the lower bound 1/K is attained, i.e., inf C P F /C sum = 1/K with the infimum taken over all K-user Gaussian BC.
The major results are summarized in Table 1 and 2. For both Gaussian MAC and BC, we also devise efficient algorithms that compute the fair solutions. In a scalar Gaussian MAC with K users, the received signal is
where X i is zero-mean Guassian with variance at most P i and Z is Gaussian noise with power N . Let C denote the Shannon capacity formula
The capacity region of a scalar Gaussian MAC is [12] R ∈ R K + :
The faces of the capacity region are hyper-planes in the form i∈S R i = c for some subset S of Ω and constant c. In vector Gaussian MAC, the received signal is
The s i 's are unit-norm column vectors of length L, X i is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance at most P i , and Z is the Gaussian noise vector with zero mean and covariance matrix N I, where I is the L × L identity matrix. The capacity region of a vector Gaussian MAC is [13] r ∈ R K + :
A typical capacity region of Gaussian MAC for 3 users is illustrated in Figure 2 . As in [14] , we will unify our treatment and present the results for MAC in more general terms. For any subset S ⊆ Ω and r = (r 1 , . . . , r K ), we use the shorthand notation r(S) := i∈S r i for the summation of components of r with indices in S.
For any function g mapping subsets of Ω to R + , let P(g) denote the polyhedron
for all subsets S and T of Ω, then g is called a rank function. Property (ii) and (iii) are called the monotonic and submodular property respectively. We say that the polyhedron P(g) is a polymatroid when g is a rank function.
The capacity regions of scalar and vector Gaussian MAC are polymatroids. For scalar Gaussian MAC, we define the rank function as
On the vector case, we define the rank function as
The collection of points that achieve equality on total data rate r(Ω) = g(Ω) is called the dominant face. Given a vector r in P(g), we say that the set S is a bottelneck of r if
For any function g : 2
whenever A ∩ C = ∅ = B ∩ C and |A| = |B|, then we say that g satisfies the order property. The heuristic meaning is as follow. If the achievable sum rate of group A is less than or equal to that of group B, then even if they cooperate with users in group C, the sum rate of group A ∪ C is still less than that of the group B ∪ C.
We have g({a}) < g({b}) but g({a, c}) > g({b, c}). This function does not satisfy the order property.
The scalar Gaussian MAC satisfies the order property, but the vector Gaussian MAC in general does not.
In both the scalar and vector Gaussian MAC, there is a canonical choice of disagreement point for the Nash bargaining solution. Each user can treat the signal of the others as noise and decode independently. For scalar Gaussian MAC, the resulting data rate for user i is
In the vector case, if user i uses linear MMSE receiver with no joint processing with others, the data rate is [15] 
where M i is the matrix
In both cases, they can be expressed in terms of the rank function as
The rate vector d
The next lemma is a useful consequence of the order property. The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
Lemma 5. Let g : 2 Ω → R + be a function that satisfies the order property.
For any subset
defined for S ⊆ Ω \ A also satisfies the order property.
Symmetric Rate Allocation
The computation of the symmetric capacity in P(g) amounts to finding the tightest constraint among r(S) ≤ g(S) for all subsets S. Each component of the symmetric rate cannot exceed g(S)/|S| for all S ⊆ Ω. The symmetric rate allocation can be computed by checking 2 K − 1 constraints. If g satisfies the order property, the symmetric capacity can be computed more efficiently using Lemma 5. The computation requires taking the minimum of only K numbers.
Theorem 6. Let g : 2
Ω → R + be a function that satisfies the order property. By relabeling we can assume that g({i}) ≤ g({j}) whenever i < j. The symmetric capacity in the polyhedron P(g) equals
Corollary 7. The infimum of fair efficiency of symmetric fairness, taken over all K-user MAC, is zero.
Proof. Suppose that the power of user 1, P 1 , is much less than the others, so that
We see that the symmetric capacity approaches zero when P 1 approaches zero, while the maximal sum approaches a positive constant.
We next compare two MACs with different power constraints. If the power constraints P 1 , . . . , P K become more disperse, then the symmetric capacity will decrease. Theorem 8. Let C sym (P, N ) be the symmetric capacity of a scalar Gaussian MAC with power constraints P and noise power
the symmetric capacity of multiple-access channel with fixed noise power is a Schur-concave function.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the power constraints are sorted in nondecreasing order,
Since scalar Gaussian MAC satisfies the order property, the corresponding symmetric rate allocations r sym and s sym are given by
and
for all k, we have
Max-min and Proportional Fair Rate Allocation
The following is a useful characterization of max-min fairness [16] . It is noted that in the theorem we do not assume that the function g is a rank function. The result holds as long as we have the submodular property. The max-min fair allocation is fairer than any other point on the dominant face in the sense of fairness induced by majorization. The max-min fair solution also has the following interpretations. Proof. Since log is a concave function, i log(r i ) is Schur-concave by Lemma 1. Because the max-min point r MM is majorized by any point r on the dominant face, we have
Hence r P F = r MM .
Corollary 13. If g satisfies the submodular property, then the max-min (and the proportional fair) point in P(g) is the point on the dominant face that minimizes the Euclidean norm.
Proof. The function f (x) = x 2 is convex. The proof is similar to the proof of the last corollary. 
We have used the order property in the second inequality. This implies that r * i−1 ≤ r * i .
A typical class of functions that satisfies the order property is the generalized symmetric functions. A rank function g is said to be generalized symmetric if it has the form
where φ is a monotonic increasing and concave function with φ(0) = 0 and Q ∈ R K + . The rank function in the scalar MAC is an example of generalized symmetric function.
The next theorem compares two Gaussian MACs, with the same total power but different distribution in the power constraints. It shows that if the distribution of power constraints is more spread out, so does the corresponding max-min fair rate allocation. The proof is relegated to the appendix.
Theorem 16. Let g be a generalized symmetric rank function defined as g(S) = φ(P(S)), for some vector P ∈ R K + . LetP be a vector that majorizes P, and g ′ be the generalized symmetric rank function g ′ (S) = φ(P(S)). Then the max-min fair capacity associated to P is the same as the max-min fair capacity associated withP, and he max-min fair point in P(g) is majorized by the max-min fair point in P(g ′ ).
Corollary 17. Let r * (P, n) be max-min fair in a Gaussian MAC with power constraints P 1 ≤ . . . ≤ P K and noise power n. If P P ′ , then r * (P, n) r * (P ′ , n).
Algorithm
We present a general recursive algorithm that computes the fair solution in Gaussian MAC. It is a variation of the algorithm in [16, p.527] , which computes the max-min fair rate vector in flow control problem. The algorithm to be described below exploits the submodular property, and has shorter running time. The basic idea is contained in the next proposition.
Proposition 18. Let g be a function mapping 2 Ω to R + , and let S 0 be a subset of Ω that achieves the minimum min
Let r * denote the the max-min or proportional fair point (they are the same by Corollary 12) 
Proof. For each i, i is contained in a bottleneck B i of r * , so that r i ≥ r j for all j ∈ B i . So r i must be larger than or equal to the average r * (B i )/|B i |, and thereby
Therefore r * i ≥ g(S 0 )/|S 0 | for all i. Summing over all i ∈ S 0 , we obtain
We must have equality in all the above inequalities. In particular, r * i = g(S 0 )/|S 0 | for all i ∈ S 0 . The set S 0 is in fact a bottleneck of r * .
This motivates the max-min algorithm.
Max-min algorithm The algorithm starts by first obtaining the subset S 0 ∈ Ω described in Proposition 18, and set the rate of users in S 0 to g(S 0 )/|S 0 |. The rate of other users are computed by recursively applying the above computation to Ω ′ := Ω \ S 0 with
for S ⊆ Ω ′ .
Remark: It is noted that we only need the submodular property in proving the correctness of the max-min algorithm. The function g need not satisfy the monotonic property or g(∅) = 0. We will use the following lemma in proving the correctness of the algorithm. Note that the lemma holds in general for arbitrary g.
Lemma 19. Let g be a function from 2
Ω to R + , and S 0 ⊆ Ω be chosen such that
Define the function
(Extension of bottleneck) Let r be a vector in
P(g) such that r(S 0 ) = g(S 0 ). Let r ′ be the restriction of the vector r on Ω ′ . If B ′ is a bottleneck of r ′ in P(g ′ ), then B ′ ∪ S 0 is a bottleneck of r in P(g).
(Preservation of order property) If g satisfies the order property, so does
Proof.
(1) By construction, we have
and B ′ ∪ A is a bottleneck of r in P(g).
(3) Let S, T and U be subsets of Ω \ S 0 so that |S| = |T | and
Theorem 20. Suppose g : 2 Ω → R + satisfies the submodular property. In the polyhedron P(g), the result obtained by the max-min algorithm is the max-min fair vector.
Proof. Let r be the vector returned by the max-min algorithm, and let S 0 be a subset of Ω such that g(S 0 )/|S 0 | = min ∅ =S⊆Ω g(S)/|S|. If S 0 = Ω, then the components in r are constant and equal g(S 0 )/|S 0 |. It belongs to P(g) because for any S ⊆ Ω
It is easy to see that r is max-min fair. Otherwise, if S 0 Ω, then we have to apply the algorithm recursively. In this case, the vector r satisfies the following properties: (i) r i = g(S 0 )/|S 0 | for all i ∈ S 0 and (ii) the components of r with index in Ω \ S 0 yield the max-min solution to the polymatroid M ′ on Ω \ S 0 with rank function g ′ defined as
in (5). It is easy to check that g ′ also satisfies the submodular property. We first verify that r is in P(g). For any subset A ⊆ Ω, we can write A as A 1 ∪ A 2 with A 1 ⊆ S 0 and A 2 ∩ S 0 = ∅. We decompose r(A) as
In the last inequality, we have used the defining property of S 0 , i.e.,
. By the submodularity of g, we have
, and thus r is in P(g).
We now show that for each i = 1, . . . , K, i is in some bottleneck A i such that r i = max{r j : j ∈ A i }. We will apply Lemma 9 and conclude that r is the max-min vector in P(g). For i ∈ S 0 , we can take S 0 as the required bottleneck A i . For i ∈ S 0 , i is an element of some bottleneck B ′ in the polyhedron P(g ′ )
such that r i ≥ r j for all j ∈ B ′ . By part (2) in the previous lemma, B ′ ∪ S 0 is a bottleneck of P(g ′ ). By Prop. 18, we can show that r i ≥ r j for all j ∈ S 0 . Indeed,
Therefore i is in the bottleneck S 0 ∪ B ′ and r i ≥ r j for all j ∈ B ′ ∪ S 0 . The vector r is thereby max-min fair by Lemma 9
Example 1 (continued) We compute the max-min fair vector in Example 1. The minimum
is achieved when S = {a}. We set r
for S ⊆ {b, c}. Now g ′ ({b}) = 2 and g ′ ({c}) = 3 = g ′ ({b, c}). So in this recursive step, we have the
The resulting max-min fair solution is
In the max-min algorithm, if we compute the minimum of g(S)/|S|, ∅ = S ⊆ Ω, in a straightforward manner by comparing 2 K − 1 numbers, the complexity of the algorithm is exponential in the number of users. A more efficient implementation was described in [7] if g is a rank function. However, when the function g satisfies the order property, we have a much faster algorithm.
Proposition 21. If the function g satisfies the order property and the submodular property, then the max-min fair point in
Proof. In the max-min algorithm, instead of finding the minimum
over all subsets of Ω, we sort g({1}), g({2}), . . . , g({K}) in nondecreasing order. This can be done in O(K log(K)) time. For notational convenience, we relabel the users so that
Since function g satisfies the order property, for any k, the minimum min{g(S)/k : S ⊆ Ω, |S| = k} is achieved by {1, 2, . . . , k} by Lemma 5. Instead of comparing g(S)/|S| over all subsets S of Ω, it is sufficient to examine g({1, . . . , k})/k, for k = 1, . . . , K. The minimum can be found in O(K) time. In the next recursion, the function g ′ (S) = g(S ∪ S 0 ) − g(S 0 ) also satisfies the order property, and
The recursion can continue without any further sorting. There are at most K recursive steps and each step takes O(K) time. The total complexity is therefore O(K 2 ).
Example 2 Consider a scalar Gaussian MAC with 4 users. Their power constraints are 2, 8, 200, and 300. We let P be the vector (2, 8, 200 , 300). The noise power at the receiver is equal to 1. Let g 1 (S) := 0.5 log(1 + P(S))
for S ⊆ Ω. Here we use the natural logarithm function. We want to find the max-min fair rate allocation or the proportional fair rate allocation in P(g 1 ). The function g 1 is a rank function and satisfies the order property. We first compute the minimum of g 1 ({1}, g 1 ({1, 2})/2, g 1 ({1, 2, 3})/3 and g 1 ({1, 2, 3, 4})/4. The minimum is g 1 ({1}) = 0.5493. We set r MM 1 = 0.5493. In the next recursive step, set
for S ⊆ {2, 3, 4}. The minimum of g 2 ({2}), g 2 ({2, 3})/2 and g 3 ({2, 3, 4})/3 is g 2 ({2}). We set r
for S ⊆ {3, 4}, and compute the minimum of g 3 ({3}) and g 3 ({3, 4})/2. The minimum is g 3 ({3, 4})2 = 0.9596, and we assign 0.9596 to both r The computation of the Nash bargaining solution in P(g) with disagreement point d amounts to finding the max-min fair solution in P(g ′ ), where
It is noted that if g is a rank function, the translated g ′ in general does not satisfy the monotonic property. However, the max-min algorithm works without assuming the monotonic property. We can apply the max-min algorithm to find the Nash bargaining solution for any disagreement point.
We conclude this section by presenting an algorithm for computing Nash bargaining solution when the rank function is generalized symmetric.
Lemma 22. Let g be a generalized symmetric rank function on Ω, g(S) = φ(P(S)),
for S ⊆ Ω, and P is a vector in R K + such that.
Then for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, the minimum
Proof. LetP i denote K j =i P j , where the summation is over all indices except i. The lemma claims that φ(P({1, . . . , k}) + k i=1 φ(P i ), is the minimum. By Lemma 1, it suffices to show that
P i from both vectors, we only need to show that
where B denote the set {i 1 , . . . , i k }.
Let Q be the vector P i1 , P i1 , . . . , P i k , j ∈B P j , and Q [1] , Q [2] , . . . , Q [K] be the components of Q in nondecreasing order. It is easy to see that
Therefore (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k , P k+1 + . . . + P K ) majorizes Q. This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Proposition 23. For a generalized symmetric rank function g, the Nash bargaining solution in P(g) with the canonical disagreement point can be computed in
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that the power constraints are arranged in nondecreasing order. Let d * denote the canonical disagreement point, i.e., for i = 1, . . . , K, d
We relabel the users so that h({1}) ≤ . . . ≤ h({K}). By the previous lemma, the minimum
The minimum can be obtained efficiently after sorting h({1}), . . . , h({K}). Suppose that the minimum is h({1, . . . , i 0 })/|i 0 |. We set r 
for all i ∈ S 0 . Each recursive step takes O(K)). As there are at most K steps, the complexity for computing the Nash bargaining solution with the canonical disagreement point is O(K 2 ).
Example 2 (cont'd)
We compute the Nash bargaining solution in the MAC as in Example 2, with the canonical disagreement point d * .
The minimum of
The last equation yields the bottleneck. We set 
Broadcast Channels
In a K-user Gaussian broadcast channel, the received signal of the ith user is
where X is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance P T and Z i is the noise at the ith receiver, which is modeled as a Gaussian variable with mean zero and variance N i . We will assume that N 1 ≤ N 2 ≤ . . . ≤ N K throughout this section. Every point r on the boundary of the capacity region satisfies
Symmetric Capacity
In order to obtain the symmetric capacity in a BC, we solve a related problem of finding the power distribution so that the users have a common SINR γ, i.e.,
The noise vector N can be expressed in terms of the power vector p by a matrix multiplication
Let G γ denote the lower triangular matrix in the above equation. The diagonal elements of G γ all equal 1/γ, and the elements below the diagonal are all −1. The following lemma is obtained by straightforward calculation.
Lemma 24. The inverse of G γ is a non-negative matrix.
Hence, given the noise powers N = (N 1 , . . . , N K ) and the SINR requirement γ, we get the corresponding power allocation by multiplying G −1 γ by N. The following theorem is an immediate consequence. It says that in a Gaussian BC, users with lower noise power uses less power.
Theorem 25. In a Gaussian BC with noise powers N 1 ≤ . . . ≤ N K , the powers corresponding to the symmetric rate allocation are in increasing order,
Proof. Let p be the power vector so that all users have SINR γ, and let h ij be the (i, j)-entry of G −1 γ . The power of user i can be obtained by
Since the first term is nonnegative, we can remove the first term and get
It is clear from the previous lemma that h ij depends only on i − j, hence
We now use the assumption
We denote the required total power by φ(N, γ), which can be computed by
where θ j (γ) denote the sum of elements in the jth column of G −1 γ . It is noted that the function θ j (γ) is a convex function of γ for all j. Furthermore, we have
Given a noise vector N, the function φ is a convex and monotonically increasing function of γ. The next theorem compares the symmetric capacity of two broadcast channels with the same total power constraint.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that the components of N 1 and N 2 are sorted in nondecreasing order. For a given total power constraint and noise vector N, we can obtain the SINR by solving the equation φ(N, γ) = P T .
The proof is complete if we can show that φ(N, γ) ≥ φ(N ′ , γ) for all γ, i.e., φ(·, γ) is Schur-concave for all γ (Fig. 3) . Indeed, for i > j, we have N i ≥ N j and
by (7) . Therefore φ(·, γ) is Schur-concave by Schur's criterion. Algorithm We have a numerical algorithm computing the symmetric capacity in Gaussian BC by means of the function φ(N, γ). For a given total power P T , we search for the value of γ so that φ(N, γ) = P T . This can be done easily as φ is a monotonic function of γ. We then compute the data rate from γ.
Corollary 28. The infimum of η sym , taken over all K-user Gaussian BC, is zero.
Proof. The sum capacity is attained if we allocate all power to user 1,
Suppose the noise power of user K, N K , is increased, while the others are fixed, the value of the function φ(N, γ) is increased for all γ. Then the symmetric capacity is decreased, but the sum capacity remains constant. By taking N K approaching infinity, η sym approaches zero.
Proportional Fair Capacity
The capacity region written in the following form is useful for computing the proportional fair allocation:
The quantity x i P T represents the sum of powers P 1 + . . . + P i .
Theorem 29. Let Φ i be a concave and monotonically increasing function for i = 1, . . . , K. Using the notation in (8) , the point that maximizes
in the capacity region of a BC with total power P T and noise powers
In particular a proportional fair allocation satisfies the equation
Proof. Suppose that
maximizes f (r). This point lies on the boundary of the capacity region. The tangent plane at r must be orthogonal to the gradient
i.e., it must be orthogonal to r ′ − r for all r ′ on the tangent plane.
Differentiate (11) with respect to x i , we obtain for i = 1, . . . , K − 1,
The two fractions in the above vector is in the ith and (i + 1)st component. This must be orthogonal to the gradient ∇f (r). Equating the dot product to zero, we get 1 2
For the proportional fair point, we take Φ i to be the log function for all i.
Corollary 30. Let r P F and γ P F be the rate vector and SINR vector corresponding to the proportional fair allocation, with N 1 ≤ . . . ≤ N K . Then the rates and SINR of the users are in decreasing order, i.e.,
Proof. From (10), we have
Since the rate is a monotonically increasing function of the SINR, the inequalities about SINR follows immediately.
Corollary 31. The infimum of η P F , taken over all K-user Gaussian BC, is equal to the lower bound 1/K.
Proof. Suppose that we fix the noise powers N 1 , . . . , N K and take P T → 0. Equation (10) implies that
for all i and j. When P T is small,
for all i and j, and p
P F i
→ P T /K at the proportional fair allocation as P T → 0. We have the following limits,
We obtain
The right hand side can be arbitrarily close to 1/K if N 1 ≪ N i for all i = 2, 3 . . . , K.
Theorem 32. In a Gaussian BC with noise power N 1 ≤ . . . ≤ N K , the corresponding powers corresponding to the proportional fair allocation are in increasing order,
Proof. We first prove the theorem in a two-user case. The noise power of user i is N i , (i = 1, 2) with N 1 ≤ N 2 . By Theorem 29, the proportional fair rate allocation is
where α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is chosen such that
That is, the value of α satisfies
The power of user 1 is αP T and the power of user 2 is (1 − α)P T . We want to show that (12) cannot hold if α ≥ 0.5.
We will apply the inequality
which holds for x > max{0, −b}. This inequality is an immediate consequence of the inequality e x < 1 + x, ∀x = 0.
Applying the inequality, we get an upper bound R.H.S. of (12) 
and a lower bound
If α ≥ 0.5, we can combine the two bounds above,
Therefore, we must have strict inequality in (12) when α ≥ 0.5. It is noted that the bounds in the above argument is valid for any N 1 and N 2 .
In a Gaussian BC with K users, consider the pair of consecutive users i and i + 1. At the proportional fair point in the capacity region,
by Theorem 29. By settingÑ
we get
We can proceed as in the 2-user case and conclude that p i < p i+1 .
From numerical examples, we have the following conjecture.
Conjecture 33. Let C P F (N, P T ) denote the proportional fair capacity of a Gaussian BC with noise vector N and total power
Algorithm
We will use the notation for the capacity region in (8) , and present an numerical algorithm that maximizes
in the capacity region of a Gaussian BC. It is assumed that Φ i is a strictly monotonically increasing and concave function, so that the inverse of the derivative Φ ′ i is easy to compute. If Φ i is the logarithm function, then the resulting point is the proportional fair solution. If Φ i (x) = log(x − d i ), the result is the Nash bargaining solution with disagreement point d.
Theorem 29 says that the equation
must holds for the optimal solution. We use this equation to express x i+1 in terms of x i for i = 2, . . . , K −1.
It reduces the problem to a one dimensional search. Given any x 1 we first compute r 2 by
and get x 2 by solving
In similar way, we compute r i and x i for i = 3, 4, . . . , K − 1. Finally r K can be obtained once we know
Define the function χ(x 1 ) as
It is a function of x 1 as the variable r K , r K−1 , x K and x K−1 all depend on x 1 . We can now search for the zero of χ(x 1 ) numerically, say χ(x * 1 ) = 0. From x * 1 , we get x * i by method described above. The vector (x * 1 , . . . , x * K ) will satisfy the condition in Theorem 29 and hence is the optimal solution. Since any zeros of χ gives rise to an optimal solution and we know that there the optimal solution is unique, the function χ has only one zero.
Conclusion
We show how to pick a point in the capacity region of Gaussian MAC and BC according to some fairness criteria. In the Gaussian MAC, there is a strong notion of fairness, namely there is a point on the dominant face that are majorized by all other points on the dominant face, and are both max-min and proportional fair. We can thus call this the fair point in the capacity region. In some particular cases, the fair point can be computed in O(K 2 ) time. For the Gaussian BC, the problem of locating the proportional fair solution or Nash bargaining solution reduces to a one-dimensional search. In both channels, fair rate allocation can be compute efficiently.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 9. (⇐) For any i ∈ Ω, suppose that i is contained in a bottleneck B, and r i = max{r j : j ∈ B}. If we want to increase r i , we have to decrease r k for some other k ∈ B. Since r i is the largest in {r j : j ∈ B}, we must have r k ≤ r i . The vector r is thus max-min fair.
(⇒) Conversely, suppose that r is a vector such that B 1 , . . . , B T are all the bottlenecks that contain i, and r i is not maximal in all such bottlenecks, i.e., r i < max{r j : j ∈ B t } for all t = 1, . . . , T . We can choose i t in B t such that r it > r i . If we increase r i by ǫ and decrease each r it by sufficiently small ǫ, the resulting vector remains in P(g). The vector r is thereby not max-min fair.
Lemma 34. Suppose that a function g : 2 Ω → R + satisfies the submodular property. Union and intersection of two bottlenecks of r in P(g) are also bottlenecks of r.
Proof. Suppose that S and T are both bottlenecks of r, i.e., r(S) = g(S) and r(T ) = g(S).
Therefore, all inequalities above are in fact equalities. In particular, r(S ∪ T ) = g(S ∪ T ) and r(S ∩ T ) = g(S ∩ T ).
The proof of Theorem 10 is divided into the next two propositions.
Proposition 35. Suppose that r
MM be the max-min fair point in P(g), where g satisfies the order property. By relabeling, we can assume without loss of generality that
where
The sets {1, . . . , i ℓ }, ℓ = 1, . . . , L, are bottlenecks of r MM . In particular, we have
i.e., the max-min fair solution lies on the dominant face of P(g).
Proof. Let B ℓ denote the set {1, . . . , i ℓ } for ℓ = 1, . . . , L.
For any element j ∈ B 1 , there is a bottleneck A j so that r j = max{r i : i ∈ A j }. If j ∈ B 1 and k ∈ B 1 , then r . Hence A j must be a subset of B 1 , for all j ∈ B 1 . By taking the union of A j over all j ∈ B 1 , we get
and we can conclude that B 1 is also a bottleneck of r MM by Lemma 34. By similar argument, we can show that B ℓ is bottleneck of r MM for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L}. Proof. Suppose that v is a point in R that does not majorize w. There is an index k, 1 ≤ k < K, such that
We can find an ℓ so that i ℓ ≤ k < i ℓ+1 . (Define i 0 := 0 and B 0 := ∅ if necessary.) Consider the collection T of all subsets S ⊆ Ω such that B ℓ ⊆ S ⊆ B ℓ+1 and |S| = k. The number of such subsets is
Since w i is constant for i ∈ B ℓ+1 \ B ℓ , we have
for all S ∈ T . Hence
We sum the above over all S ∈ T , S∈T i∈S
The left hand side in the above inequality equals
Similarly, the right hand side of (14) equals
We rewrite (14) as
Since a ≥ b, w(B ℓ ) ≥ v(B ℓ ) and w(B ℓ+1 ) ≥ v(B ℓ+1 ), the left hand side must be less than or equal to zero. We get a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 16. Suppose without loss of generality that P 1 ≤ . . . ≤ P K andP 1 ≤ . . . ≤P K . Let r * andr * be the max-min fair point in P(g) and P(g ′ ) respectively. It is clear that g({1}) ≤ . . . ≤ g({K}), g ′ ({1}) ≤ . . . ≤ g ′ ({K}), and both g and g ′ satisfy the order property. By Theorem 15, we obtain r * The minimal value equals k j=1r * j . We are optimizing a smaller objective function over the same feasible region. As a result, we must have k j=1 r j ≥ k j=1r * j .
